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Smart thinking, lockdown and Covid-19:
Implications for public policy
Morris Altman1*
Abstract
The response to Covid-19 has been overwhelmingly to lockdown much the world’s economies in order to
minimize death rates as well as the immediate negative effects of Covid-19. I argue that such policy is too often
de-contextualized as it ignores policy externalities, assumes death rate calculations are appropriately accurate
and, as well, assumes focusing on direct Covid-19 effects to maximize human welfare is appropriate. As a result
of this approach, current policy can be misdirected, with highly negative effects on human welfare. Moreover,
such policies can inadvertently result in not minimizing death rates (incorporating externalities) at all, especially
in the long run. Such misdirected and sub-optimal policy is a product of policy makers using inappropriate mental
models which are lacking in a number of key areas: the failure to take a more comprehensive macro perspective
to address the virus; using bad heuristics or decision-making tools; relatedly not recognizing the differential
effects of the virus; and adopting herding strategy (follow-the-leader) when developing policy. Improving the
decision-making environment, inclusive of providing more comprehensive governance and improving mental
models, could have lockdowns throughout the world thus yielding much higher levels of human welfare.
JEL Classification: B41; D00; D70; E70; I18
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Introduction
This paper challenges the extreme nudging (Thaler & Sun-
stein, 2009) perspective that has dominated most national
responses to the Covid-19 pandemic. It also challenges the
acceptance of simple binary policy options that appear to have
been proffered to the public in dealing with the Covid-19
virus: either lockdown the entire economy and more people
live, or, effectively maintain the status quo and more people
die. The latter ignores both the short- and long-term conse-
quences and opportunity costs of shutting down the economy
which will also sadly cost lives while destroying livelihoods
and negatively impacting levels of socio-economic wellbeing.
This type of extreme nudging, best captured by the lockdown
strategy, implemented in the world’s largest economies, ig-
nores the possibility that a much less extreme response to
mitigating the effects of the virus was and is possible. These
would have lessened the overall long-term impact of Covid-19
on deaths and wellbeing.
Policy makers needed to adopt more holistic, nuanced, and
methodologically pluralistic approaches to Covid-19 so as to
effectively minimize the overall short- and long-term negative
effects of the virus. Such policy approaches are articulated
in this paper and represent one of its unique contributions.
I further argue that more holistic and pluralistic approaches
suggest that extreme measures should not have been taken or,
at least, not continued as long as they were, in most cases. I
also argue that amongst the reasons these extreme measures
reigned supreme is the incompleteness of scientific informa-
tion and/or the inadequate understandings of the limits of the
scientific information made available to policy makers and
leaders. These inadequacies resulted in decision-making herd-
ing (follow the leader) (Altman, 2012; Baddeley, 2013, 2018;
Keynes, 1936). The herding effect was then reinforced by
public shaming of those who deviated from the norm. Leaders
ended up maintaining the status quo in order to preserve their
personal credibility and status as decision-makers, at least in
the short run.
The response to Covid-19, world-wide, has been to lock-
down or shut down as much of the world’s economies as
possible in order to minimize death rates. These rates are cal-
culated using the number of deaths divided by the number of
those counted as having the virus. Counting who has the virus
varies greatly across space and time (related to the number of
people being tested) and is thus, more often than not, seriously
flawed. Nevertheless, policy makers and many of their advi-
sors are steadfastly focused on minimizing death rates and
the immediate negative effects of Covid-19. It follows, there-
fore, that they implement policies so as to minimize measured
deaths believed to be a direct or immediate result of Covid-19.
I argue that such policy is de-contextualized, ignores policy
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externalities, and assumes death rate calculations are adequate
and remotely accurate. Current policy can be misdirected and
can therefore have long and even short-term negative effects
on human welfare and thus result in not actually minimizing
death rates (incorporating externalities), especially in the long
run. Such misdirected and sub-optimal policy is a product
of policy makers using inappropriate mental models – where
mental models are defined as the practical theoretical frame-
works that individuals adopt to inform their decision-making
(Altman, 2014; Denzau & North, 1994). These include not
taking a broader macro perspective when addressing the virus,
using bad heuristics or decision-making tools, and adopting
herding strategy (follow-the-leader) when developing policy.
Poor decision-making is reinforced by the reality of cogni-
tive dissonance,1 sunk cost fallacy2, power relationships, as
well as the inadequacy of voice and democratic governance
(Hirschman, 1970). Improving the decision-making environ-
ment with improved mental models could have resulted in
smarter policy which, in turn, should not have resulted in
extreme economic lockdowns throughout the world with all
of the socio-economic damage that this entails.
Simplistic approach to policy
determination
The easiest and least costly policy in terms of psychological
and economic costs in response to the Covid-19 challenge is
to shut down the economy. This is a binary black or white
approach to policy and is relatively simple to implement and
articulate. This approach does not require much sophisticated
socio-economic analysis to contextualize policies designed
with the hope of minimizing death rates and determining other
ways of minimizing the number of new Covid-19 cases. It also
deflects from efforts to invest in the health sector infrastructure
required to combat Covid-19, for example. This particular
approach tends to focus on the short run: what is the impact
of a policy within the next few weeks or months?
Implicitly assumed here is that the focus on the immedi-
ate direct effects of the virus has less negative downstream
consequences or externalities than not locking down the econ-
omy, which it is argued would result in a net increase in death
rates. Moreover, this approach pays little or no attention
to the largely non-death consequences of the more extreme
lockdown approach. This involves the impact of government-
created depression on the socio-economic wellbeing of society
at large, such as bankruptcies, unemployment, poverty, gen-
erational poverty, loss of human capital, suicide, spousal and
child abuse. It also involves the longer-term consequences of
disrupted supply chains on socio-economic wellbeing. Finally,
1In this case, cognitive dissonance occurs when an individual deviating
from peer or societal norms causes psychological pain, which often leads to
conformity to these norms and can contribute to herding behaviour.
2In this case, individuals will not change their behaviour given the past
and invest in a particular behaviour even though it is recognized that their
past behaviour might be wrong. The net psychological pain change is too
great.
the extreme lockdown approach implicitly assumes that there
can’t be a more intermediate nuanced way to deal with the
Covid-19 pandemic that will minimize the negative impact on
our socio-economic wellbeing, where the latter incorporates
death rates.
This type of binary argument is illustrated in Figure 1, by
line segment 0S. When the extent of economic openness is
zero (extreme lockdown), there should be zero death rates. As
the economy is increasingly more open the death rate initially
increases quite rapidly and then eventually diminishes as the
economy opens up to the extreme. This diagrammatic repre-
sentation of arguments made by many experts and politicians
should be interrogated by the evidence to determine if this
hypothesis is actually correct.
Figure 1. Lockdown, policy interventions and death rates.
Behavioural economics, as articulated by Herbert Simon
(1978, 1987; Altman, 2012, 2017b, 2017c) and enriched by
institutionalists, recommends a more refined empirically in-
formed approach to policy in general. Fundamentally, all
policy is informed by some sort of theory, either explicitly
or deeply embedded in the mind of the decision-maker. This
represents the policy maker’s or analyst’s mental model (Alt-
man, 2014), effectively her or his way of thinking through
particular issues or questions. Inappropriate mental models
can result in serious errors in decision-making. Therefore,
getting the mental model right is of critical importance. In
the ‘Simon’ approach it is important that a model be empiri-
cally based; its assumptions must also be empirically rooted.
And relatedly, the model should incorporate the particular
institutional environment of the society whose problems it is
designed to explain and address – in our case the Covid-19
pandemic. From this modelling approach the extreme policy
approach of extreme lockdown should be seen as but one of
many options which may include less drastic measures.
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Figure 2. Derived from data in: Worldometer (2020).
Problems with the prevailing mental
model: what death rate estimates reveal
With respect to the data used, reference is made to the death
rate in terms of recorded deaths in relation to individuals iden-
tified as having the virus. But given that the latter represents
the denominator of the death rate equation and depends on
the percentage of the population tested for the virus, this cal-
culation can be highly misleading. This is especially true
when testing is not generalized and testing tends to be focused
on those who have a higher probability of having contracted
the Covid-19 virus. In this case, increasing testing reduces
the measured death rates. The relatively more accurate death
rate measure would be deaths per 1,000 or 1 million of the
population, whether tested or not.
In this case, one must ask the question: are countries
with more extreme lockdown policies the most effective in
minimizing death rates? And, is it the case that countries
with more moderate policies are generally characterized by
increasing death rates? The Covid-19 crisis is ongoing and
data are incomplete, but enough data are available to provide
some preliminary answers to the above questions.3 Death
rate estimates are presented in Figure 2. The data presented
3For some excellent summary statistics see, FT Visual and Data Journal-
ism Team (2020).
are selective. One needs to bear in mind that some coun-
tries, especially where democratic governance is lacking, can
more easily underreport deaths if it is to the advantage of the
political elite to do so. Hence, the data presented here are
for democratic countries. What is clear from the data is that
Sweden, with a more libertarian approach to the Covid-19
virus and no lockdown of the economy, has a lower death
rate than other countries that implemented extreme lockdown
policies. On the other hand, Sweden’s death rates are higher
than some countries that have implemented more extreme
lockdown policies. But then we have South Korea which has
not adopted extreme lockdown policies but has amongst the
lowest death rates from Covid-19 in the world. And, South
Korea’s low death rates are comparable with the death rates
in New Zealand and Australia which have implemented more
extreme lockdown policies, with New Zealand’s being more
extreme than Australia’s. And, finally, we have Singapore
with a less extreme lockdown policy than New Zealand (more
akin to South Korea), with a death rate of 3 per 1 million com-
parable to South Korea’s low death rate. Relatively libertarian
Iceland has also done extremely well, amongst the best in our
sample.
The direct deadly effects of Covid-19 continue but the
data, incomplete as they are, suggest that there is no strong
statistical relationship between extreme lockdown policies
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Figure 3. Derived from data in Roser, Ritchie, Ortiz-Ospina & Hasell (2020).
and the desired solution of relatively low Covid-19 related
death rates. Simply, closing one’s economy is not the cure
or solution to minimizing death rates. On the other hand,
simply having a minimalist lockdown policy is not necessarily
correlated with the lowest of death rates. Sweden has done
much better than many countries without locking down its
economy. But other countries with much more restrictive
policies, for example other Nordic countries, have lower death
rates per million. However, what is of critical importance here
is the fact that South Korea and Iceland (admittedly a very
small country: 364,00), as well as Singapore (population 5.6
million) with minimalist lockdown policies, have amongst the
lowest death rates. South Korea’s population stands at around
52 million. And, it should be noted, countries with minimalist
lockdown policies have all implemented credible policies to
mitigate the effects of Covid-19. No successful country is
doing nothing (Politico, 2020; Rolander, 2020).
But being proactive against Covid-19 is not the same thing
as locking down the economy. What these data suggest is that
an extreme lockdown policy is not a necessary condition to
generate relatively low death rates. One can generate low
death rates without severely damaging the economy. These
data also suggest that variables not related to locking down the
economy are critical to minimizing Covid-19 related deaths.
If this is the case, then opening up the economy need not gen-
erate increasing death rates if appropriate conditions (which
must be identified) are in place. Simply assuming that lock-
downs are the panacea for Covid-19 because they minimize
contact between individuals is problematic. This particular
mental model (falsely) assumes away other methods of con-
trolling Covid-19 that would not have produced such serious
deleterious effects on the economy.
Related to current available data on death rates, it also
clear that countries ranging from the more extreme to the least
extreme lockdown policies are experiencing similar peaks to
death rates (Figure 3). The growth rates of Covid-19 related
deaths are diminishing, flattening out, approaching zero, in the
countries selected for Figure 3 where the data are mapped out
to a log scale to illustrate growth rates. Adopting less extreme
policy does not appear to have prevented the growth in death
rates from eventually collapsing, whilst more extreme policies
do not appear to have shortened the time by when these death
rates began to collapse. Locking down the economy does not
appear to be a necessary condition for collapsing the growth of
Covid-19 related death rates in ‘good’ time. This collapse in
growth rates occurs in all of our sample countries irrespective
of how severe or lax their lockdown policies are. But different
countries peak at different levels in absolute terms (Figure 3).
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The data do not support the dominant mental model, il-
lustrated in Figure 1, that extreme lockdown is a necessary
condition to minimize Covid-19 death rates. The hypothesis
that the data do support, illustrated in Figure 1, is that limited
lockdown policy is consistent with relatively low and rela-
tively high death rates. This is given by line segment AD.
Given limited lockdown, I would argue that what makes a
difference is the type of policies implemented whilst keeping
economies relatively open. As already mentioned, relatively
open Sweden did better than extreme lockdown economies,
but its death rate is relatively high. And, this points to the
importance of policy. On the other hand, extreme lockdown
policy is consistent with both high and low death rates as illus-
trated by line segment BE. This also points to the importance
of policy as well. For example, the United Kingdom and New
Zealand implemented relatively extreme lockdown policy, but
New Zealand’s death rate is extremely low and the United
Kingdom’s is one of the very highest in my sample. ADEB
in Figure 1 illustrates the wide array of openness/death rate
combinations that are possible. But what is of critical impor-
tance is that this modelling scenario holds out the possibility
of low death rates with limited lockdown and high death rates
and an extreme lockdown of the economy.
Options to control the immediate
consequences of Covid-19
Given what we do know, it is important to note how relatively
open economies, ones that have not been locked down, have
been able to achieve relatively low death rates. There are other
options to a complete lockdown. South Korean, for example,
opted for an immediate co-ordinated approach across all levels
of government and medical facilities, identifying vulnerable
populations, providing ready supplies of hospital beds and
medical supplies, transparency, and relatively large scale test-
ing followed by case management of identified cases with
contact tracing, and re-testing and mandated self-isolation
of Covid-19 victims (with financial support for the latter),
some school closures and restriction on large events. This
took place in the context of a relatively well-funded health
sector which allowed for the sector to properly treat Covid-19
patients. Social distancing rules were also put in place as
well as well as recommendations for the wearing of, and then
the distribution of, face masks – an already well established
practice in Asian countries to mitigate the passing a virus to
the person next to you – together with the availability of Per-
sonal Protective Equipment (PPE) for essential workers. Face
masks were made available at no or low costs and the supply
was co-ordinated by the government once it was clear that the
private sector on its own could not equitably meet market de-
mand. Of critical importance, however, was the co-ordinated
and well-financed programme of case management, testing,
contact tracing and self-isolation. This meant that there was
no lockdown of the economy (Buchwald, 2020; Campbell,
2020; Fleming, 2020; OECD, 2020). Iceland’s successful
non-lockdown policy also heavily relied on radical testing,
followed by case management of identified patients with con-
tact tracing, and re-testing with mandated self-isolation of
Covid-19 victims. Social distancing and the closure of some
facilities were also mandated (LeMieux, 2020).
Similarly, Sweden’s point of focus has been on identifying
vulnerable populations, social distancing and self-isolation
as well as on regulating event size and some (minimal) fa-
cility closures and event cancellations. There has been more
focused (less expensive), as opposed to widespread, Covid-19
testing as compared to the testing approach adopting in South
Korea and Iceland (radical testing is also the approach taken
in relatively successful Singapore) (Townsend, 2020). Swe-
den has been less successful than South Korea in minimizing
death rates, but more successful than many other economies
locking down their economies. Its less aggressive approach
to controlling the virus given the openness of its economy
could have been a key cause of its relatively high death rate
as compared to relatively open South Korea, for example.
The cost of lockdown, inclusive of the eventual loss of life,
has not yet been considered. There are effective substitutes
to locking down the economy. But these require taking a
leadership role in facilitating the adoption of these substitutes.
This can only take place in societies where leaders believe
that these substitutes exist and are effective and viable – much
depends on the mental models adopted by decision-makers
and the information that they have available to them. South
Korea, for example, having learnt from their SARS experience
in 2003 and MERS in 2015, made available the required
economic resources and put in place a governance structure to
gain control over Covid-19 without locking down the economy
(Cho, 2020). But Iceland, with no such prior experience, did
the same.
An important question arises when such resources are
not available. Some economies can potentially mobilise the
required resources when required if these resources are not
already in place. Yet, for other economies, those that are
relatively poor, financial resources are not there. But in either
case, to mobilise resources, decision-makers must accept that
there are alternatives to lockdown and establish which alter-
natives best fit their economies at that time. This emphasizes
the importance of mental models in formulating policies.
It is also important to understand that there are different
levels of response to Covid-19 which are overall less costly
financially. Policy makers can then think through these al-
ternatives and their impact on death rates and the economy.
These different levels of response could involve more em-
phasis on social distancing, the banning of larger gatherings,
regulations on improvements to health, safety and cleanliness
standards in places of work, sources of food supply and dis-
tribution, retail and wholesale outlets, gyms, etc., and more
focused testing and contact tracing, as well as the more se-
lective use of PPE where there are shortages. One concrete
example concerns sanitary conditions in the domain of food
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preparation and supply.4 Recall, that the probable point of
origin for the coronavirus appears to have been in the less than
sanitary and unregulated Huanan seafood market in Wuhan.
Another example is the rapid spread of the virus in care
homes around the world where clusters erupted particularly
in those homes where acute PPE shortages were experienced.
It is estimated that up to 50 percent of the Covid-19 related
deaths in Europe have occurred in care homes according to the
World Health Organization (Booth, 2020). One does not have
to lockdown the economy to address issues related to poorly
regulated or maintained open markets and the lack of neces-
sary personal protective equipment for health care providers
(Booth, 2020). This approach also applies to opening up a
lockdown economy. One should note that one failure in the
Swedish approach was not paying enough attention to its care
homes where a large percentage (about 45 percent) of its
Covid-19 deaths occurred. This is contrast to what occurred
in South Korea and Singapore, for example, where very few
Covid-19 related death took place in care facilities. Overall,
about 90 percent of Sweden’s Convid-19 death were over 70.
In the more extreme lockdown Belgium about 50 percent of
the Covid-19 deaths took place in care homes (Observer Re-
porters, 2020; Orange, 2020). Simply paying more attention
to care homes and the elderly would have slashed death rates.
This has nothing to do with locking down the economy or
spending large sums of money (Kwon, 2020; Lintern, 2020;
Observer Reporters, 2020).
Once it is understood that a necessary condition to con-
trolling Covid-19 is not a lockdown, substitutes to a lockdown
become vitally important. Government can also more aggres-
sively facilitate increasing the supply of critical shortages in
goods and services such as in PPE and in testing and tracing
equipment. And, this nuanced approach could and should
then be placed in the context of the opportunity cost of lock-
down when there are viable alternatives to lockdown. Extreme
lockdown does have consequences which need to be modelled
when formulating anti-Covid-19 policy. The assumption that
locking down the economy is optimal and necessary is not
supported by the evidence. And, this assumption, underly-
ing much of current policy (and their mental model drivers)
allows decision makers to make the simple choice of choos-
ing lockdown as this appears to be the only rational choice
available.
Some of the successful policies undertaken by the rela-
tively successful open economies are highlighted in Table
One. What is clear is that Sweden was less aggressive than
other relatively open economies in tackling Covid-19. It was
much more selective and voluntary in its approach and very
much less focussed on care centres. This would help explain
why Sweden’s open economy policy was less successful than
that of others. But its more libertarian approach (which still
4Sanitary conditions within the household is also critical to the reduction
of death rates, increased life expectancy, and reduced morbidity, even when
there are no pandemic viruses and even when controlling for income (Altman
& Lamontagne, 2004).
involved significant government intervention) proved to be
more successful than the largely locking-down-the-economy
approach of so many of its neighbours.
Problems with the prevailing mental
model: going beyond immediate effects
The narrow focus on the immediate effects of Covid-19 on
death rates, with a further focus of on locking down the econ-
omy as the key to gaining control over these direct effects,
ignores both the longer-term consequences of lockdown on
death rates and on overall socio-economic wellbeing. This is a
critical flaw of the extreme lockdown policy, which implicitly
assumes that the negative ‘externalities’ of such policy will be
less than the economic and human costs of lockdown, even
with respect to the immediate death rate.
This focus on lockdown also shifts attention from specific
policies to address Covid-19. The experience in care homes,
where many of the most vulnerable members of society reside,
and the ever-growing number of Covid-19 related deaths that
are now being ‘discovered’ in such homes in all countries
which adopted extreme lockdown policies, is a case in point.
This speaks to the failure of the initial focus on lockdown as
the panacea to ‘controlling the spread of the virus’. But the
transmission of the virus in care homes in all cases, lockdown
or not, has proven to be particularly deadly. Critics of the
Swedish approach have been blaming the lack of lockdown for
the high Covid-19 death rate in these homes (Orange, 2020).
But clearly the care home experience in the UK, Europe, and
North America refutes the veracity of this claim.
In this paper, I cannot estimate the possible additional
costs of locking down the economy, we leave that to future
research. But my point here is that it is important to model
one’s approach to minimizing the damage caused by Covid-
19 by incorporating both the direct and indirect effects of
the virus. Therefore, locking down the economy will have
different consequences and costs than taking a more nuanced
approach such as that adopted by South Korea and Iceland as
well as in Singapore. Sweden, it bears repeating, had a much
more laissez-faire approach, which was not as aggressive or
sweeping as South Korea’s. One’s model should incorpo-
rate a longer-term time frame to determine the best (welfare
maximizing) approach for government to take when tackling
Covid-19 and when the locked down economies begin to open
up.
Amongst the costs of lockdown is increasing unemploy-
ment. According to the International Labour Organization
(2020) about 50 percent of the global workforce will lose their
source of economic livelihood. Related to this, firms will go
bankrupt, individuals will lose their homes, families will be
impoverished, families will go hungry, family violence will
increase, and mental breakdowns will increase. The World
Bank (BBC, 2020) expected that 60 million people will be
pushed into extreme poverty erasing the impressive gains to
poverty alleviation that have taken place over the past few
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Policy Sweden South Korea Singapore Iceland
Well-funded health care sector Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transparency of accurate information to all citizens Yes Yes Yes Yes
Selective Bans on international travel (some countries Yes Yes Yes Yes
more severe than others)
Targeted support for the vulnerable population (including Yes, Yes Yes Yes
the elderly population) but limited
Social distancing Yes Yes Yes Yes
Banning of large meetings/events Yes Yes Yes Yes
Care facilities focus No Yes Yes Yes
Selective closure of venues or institutions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Testing Selective, but Yes Yes Yes
expanding
Contact tracing Yes, more Yes, extensive, Yes, more Yes, more
selective more extreme extensive extensive
Wearing of facemasks Selective Yes Yes Yes
Personal Protective Equipment Selective Yes Yes Yes
Handwashing/no face touching info protocols Yes Yes Yes Yes
Isolation/self-isolation/quarantine Largely Yes Yes Yes
voluntary
Socio-economic support for isolated population Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1. Anti-Covid-19 policies for open economies.
years. And, the negative impact of extreme lockdown policies
hit the poor, middle income individuals, Gig economy employ-
ees, and SMEs, most of all. There is a highly inequalitarian
impact of extreme lockdown policy that must be modelled and
be given due analytical consideration. Of course, not all of
these effects will last forever, much depends on government
policy, but these longer-term effects of lockdown policy will
reduce the wellbeing of billions of individuals globally.
More specifically, the negative economic consequences of
extreme lockdown policy will include increasing deaths from
this type of policy which, I’ve argued, are not necessary to
effectively combat the Covid-19 pandemic. Deaths would be
a product of suicide and mental health issues, poverty, alcohol
and drug abuse, increasing mortality rates, and shortening indi-
viduals’ expected life span, for example (Pell & Lesser, 2020).
It is even possible that deaths resulting from extreme lock-
down induced economic depression could exceed the death
resulting from Covid-19 (about 260,000 as of May 6, 2020;
this is expected to increase). For example, the United Nations
warns that hundreds of thousands of children will die as a
result of lockdown induced economic depressions (Nichols,
2020). The very real possibility that economic depression
related deaths will be substantial needs to be carefully inter-
rogated and estimated. The longer-term impact of lockdown
policy must be carefully modelled and understood before
adopting extreme lockdown policy which largely ignores the
long-term consequences of such policy. But the point here is
that such deaths can be largely avoided by adopting alternative
existing methods of combatting Covid-19. These alternatives
would minimize, in relative terms, the long-term negative
effects on the economy and society at large.5
Why policy can take the wrong turn
Decision-makers and their advisors design policy with the
information at hand; but they do so in the context with in-
formation being imperfect, asymmetric, and costly (Akerlof,
1970; see also H. Altman, 2020). Moreover, decision-makers
and their advisors make use of this information based on their
ability to process and understand the information afforded
to them. These variables are central to Simon’s notion of
5It is important to note how governments historically dealt with deadly
pandemics. The Black Death or Bubonic Plague killed between 30 and 60
percent of Europe’s population in the fourteenth century. Government was
able to control this pandemic when it focused on identifying affected individu-
als and isolating them and by quarantining affected population cohorts (Mark
2020). The Spanish Flu, originating in the United States, killed between 50
and 100 million people between 1918 and 1920, with a world population of
2 billion. Currently about 330,000 have died from Covid-19 with a world
population of 8 billion. The flu’s death rate was cut by half in the USA when
government closed schools, shops, and restaurants, regulated public trans-
portation, mandated social distancing, banned public gatherings, and imposed
targeted quarantines (Strochlic & Champine, 2020). A key to flattening the
death rate curve was social distancing (Strochlic & Champine, 2020).
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bounded rationality (1978, 1987). The mental models adopted
play a critical role in locating, processing and understand-
ing the information required to make policy recommenda-
tions and decisions. These models are built upon specific be-
havioural and institutional assumptions, typically not interro-
gated by decision-makers and their advisors. In the real world
of bounded rationality, rational individuals can make poor
decisions that can have seriously negative socio-economic
effects. In effect, rational decision-makers and their advisors
adopt decision-making shortcuts or heuristics (Gigerenzer,
2007; see also Kahneman, 2011), to make their decisions and
provide their advice. These heuristics can be good or bad.
The quality of decision-making is affected by the quality of
mental models they employ which, in turn, affects the data
searched for and analysed, and the questions asked. Bad or
poor heuristics can yield errors in decision-making (Altman
H., 2020; Altman M., 2017a, 2017b, 2017c).
Given the above, bad decisions can be triggered when
more socially optimal decisions and policies, especially from a
longer-term perspective, are more costly (in the short run) and
difficult to operationalize. With regards to Covid-19, it is more
complex and more difficult to implement and reinforce a strict
regime – of social distancing, self-isolation, contact tracing
and testing, and accessing and providing personal protective
equipment (PPE), and emergency care for affected individuals
– than it is to lock down the economy. This is especially
true when experts and herd leaders celebrate lockdown as the
optimal policy solution to most effectively dealing with the
Covid-19 pandemic and pay little attention to the longer-term
consequences of lockdown.
These errors (which can be rationally based) can be persis-
tent and spread across decision-makers in a world of bounded
rationality when the herding heuristic (follow the leader) is
employed. And rational decision-makers will engage in herd-
ing when the decision-makers are themselves uncertain what
the best-practice decisions and related policies might be and
believe that others: experts, leaders, superiors, know better
than they what the optimal course of action happens to be.
This behaviour is quite common and exemplified by herd be-
haviour in financial markets. Such behaviour is reinforced
when decision-makers have a vested interest in maintaining a
decision or a policy stance once it is made (status quo bias),
for fear of loss of pride, reputation or status, or fear of de-
viating from herd leaders, especially when these leaders are
in positions of power. Maintaining error prone decisions is
also most likely when the personal costs of so doing (given
the psychological costs of changes one’s course of action) are
relatively low. Costs are largely borne by society at large.
I would argue that this basic modelling narrative helps to
explain decision-making advice and policy during the Covid-
19 pandemic. Where the dominant view was that extreme
lockdown of the economy was the best course of action to
minimize deaths, this perspective was adopted by policy ad-
visers and decision-makers. Decisions had to be taken quickly
and were made predicated upon what was believed to be the
best course of action. However, the decision-making was
skewed in the sense that alternative modelling scenarios ap-
pear not to have been carefully considered, especially where
there were viable alternatives to lockdown strategies. This
lack of consideration appears to be related to the costs of
deviating from herd behaviour and also to the lack of voice
provided to alternative perspectives on how best to minimize
the overall and long-term costs of Covid-19.
Conclusion
Globally, locking down the economy has been the major tool
adopted to combat Covid-19. This was, and is, a simple so-
lution to a complex problem and, therefore, was a relatively
easy choice to make given crisis circumstances within which
decisions had to be taken. This was and is a case where
decision-makers rationally adopted herd heuristics. I argue
that this approach is an example of adopting inappropriate,
error-prone, and highly damaging and even deadly heuristics
(Altman, 2017b, 2017c; Altman H., 2020). The approach
taken also was a binary one for many: either lockdown the
economy or keep it open with little or no controls or regula-
tions imposed. This binary and narrow approach represents
the application of an inappropriate mental model or analytical
framework generating serious errors in decision-making.
Although lockdown is an accepted mechanism to con-
trol or eliminate Covid-19, I argue that this approach is not
supported even by a preliminary review of the evidence with
respect to the desired outcome of minimizing deaths. The sam-
ple data that I present and review, all of which are in the public
domain, strongly suggest that lockdown is not a necessary con-
dition for effectively controlling Covid-19. Relatively open
economies have done relatively well with regards to deaths
per one million individuals. Most spectacularly, this is the
case with South Korea, but with Iceland and Singapore as well.
In Europe one can see Sweden is more successful than many
locked down European economies, although not as successful
as its more lockdown prone Nordic neighbours. But what is
important to note is that these relatively open economies did
not simply maintain the pre-Covid status quo, instead they
implemented initiatives, with success, to address Covid-19.
Current policy perspectives ignore the viable alternatives to
lockdown.
The current dominant view also tends to ignore the longer-
term effects of lockdown related policies. Preliminary ev-
idence suggest that lockdown policy will have significant
negative impacts on socio-economic wellbeing, by increasing
death rates, increasing poverty, deducing human capital, in-
creasing mortality rates, and reducing life expectancy, causing
significant bankruptcies and dramatically increasing govern-
ment debt. These costs need to be brought into play when
evaluating lockdown-based policy. And, given available alter-
natives, it does not appear that extreme lockdown is the opti-
mal approach to addressing the Covid-19 pandemic. On the
other hand, it is critical to understand that lockdown requires
other significant policies to effectively minimize the deadly
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impact of Covid-19. Once again, the choice is not a binary
one. Overall, a broader and more nuanced decision-making
perspective recognizes that there is no necessary trade-off be-
tween minimizing the short- and long-run effects of Covid-19
whilst keeping the economy open in the context of appropriate
policy design that is in place and enforced.
To improve the decision-making process, it is critical to
acknowledge how decisions tend to be made and are actually
made given a world of bounded rationality. One of the lessons
from how governments have developed and implemented pol-
icy is that all too often policy is based on very narrow and
simplistic mental models, not clearly informed by the evi-
dence. What is required are mechanisms in place to provide
quality information and analysis to decision-makers as well
as to the general public. This could minimize the adoption
of inappropriate sub-optimal heuristics by decision-makers
and even amongst their advisors. This can best take place in
an environment of democratic governance. But this demo-
cratic framework must provide voice to experts from different
perspectives without fear of retribution from thinking outside
of the box. This type of democratic space is not a natural or
inevitable by-product of democratic governance.
Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Hannah Altman and Louise Lamontagne for
their very helpful comments and suggestions. Also, thanks
to the referees and Michelle Baddeley for their helpful com-
ments.
References
Akerlof, George (1970). The Market for ‘Lemons’: Qual-
ity, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 84: 488–500.
Altman, Hannah Josepha Rachel (2020). The behavioural
economics of organisational inefficiency: The example
of the New Zealand fitness industry. Master of Philoso-
phy thesis, Queensland University of Technology. Ac-
cessed May 5, 2020 at: https://eprints.qut.edu.au/198038/.
Altman, Morris (2012). Behavioral Economics for Dummies.
Wiley: Mississauga, Canada.
Altman, Morris (2014). Mental Models, Bargaining Power,
and Institutional Change. Paper presented at World
Interdisciplinary Network for Institutional Research,
First International Conference, University of Green-
wich, London, UK, September 11–14.
Altman, Morris (2017a). Policy Consequences of Multiple
Equilibria and the Indeterminacy of Economic Out-
comes in a Boundedly Rational World: Closing the
System with Non-Economic Variables. Forum for So-
cial Economics, 64: 234–251.
Altman, Morris (2017b). “Rational Inefficiency: Smart
Thinking, Bounded Rationality, and the Scientific Basis
for Economic Failure and Success”, in Morris Altman
(ed.), Handbook of Behavioural Economics and Smart
Decision-Making Rational Decision-Making within the
Bounds of Reason. Cheltenham, England: Edward El-
gar.
Altman, Morris, editor (2017c). Handbook of Behavioural
Economics and Smart Decision-Making: Rational Deci
sion-Making within the Bounds of Reason. Cheltenham,
England: Edward Elgar.
Altman, Morris & Lamontagne, Louise (2004). Gender, Hu-
man Capabilities and Culture Within the Household
Economy: Different Path to Socio-Economic Well-
Being? International Journal of Socio-Economics, 31:
325–364.
Baddeley, Michelle (2013). Herding, Social Influence and
Expert Opinion. Journal of Economic Methodology,
20(1): 35–44.
Baddeley, Michelle (2018). Copycats and Contrarians - Why
We Follow Others, and When We Don’t. London/New
Haven: Yale University Press.
BBC (2020). Coronavirus: World Bank Warns 60m at Risk
of ‘Extreme Poverty’. BBC News. Accessed May 20,
2020 at www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-52733706.
Booth, Robert (2020). Half of coronavirus deaths happen in
care homes, data from EU suggests. The Guardian. As-
sessed May 4, 2020 at: www.theguardian.com/world/20
20/apr/13/half-of-coronavirus-deaths-happen-in-care-ho
mes-data-from-eu-suggests.
Buchwald, Elisabeth (2020). What we can learn from South
Korea and Singapore’s efforts to stop coronavirus (be-
sides wearing face mask). MarketWatch. Accessed May




Campbell, Charlie (2020). South Korea’s Health Minister
on How His Country Is Beating Coronavirus Without a
Lockdown. Time. Assessed May 3, 2020 at: time.com/
5830594/south-korea-covid19-coronavirus/.
Cho, Hael-Woi (2020). Effectiveness for the response to
Covid-19: The MERS Outbreak Containment Proce-
dures. Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives,
1: 1-2.
Denzau, A., & North, D. C. 1994. Shared Mental Models:
Ideologies and Institutions. Kyklos Fasc 1: 3–31.
Smart thinking, lockdown and Covid-19: Implications for public policy — 32/33
Fleming, Sean (2020). South Korea’s Foreign Minister ex-
plains how the country contained COVID-19. World
Economic Forum. Accessed May 3, 2020 at: www.wefo
rum.org/agenda/2020/03/south-korea-covid-19-contain
ment-testing/.
FT Visual and Data Journalism Team (2020). Coronavirus
Tracked: The Latest Figures as Countries Fight to Con-
tain the Pandemic. Financial Times. Accessed May 20,
2020 at www.ft.com/content/a26fbf7e-48f8-11ea-aeb3-
955839e06441.
Gigerenzer, Gerd (2007). Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of
the Unconscious. New York: Viking.
Hannan, Daniel (2020). If Sweden succeeds, lockdowns will
all have been for nothing. Accessed April 26, 2020 at:
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/04/25/sweden-succe
eds-lockdownswill-have-nothing/comments.
Henley, Jon (2020). Sweden queries basis of lockdowns as
Germany keeps its guard up. The Guardian. Accessed
April 26, 2020 at: www.theguardian.com/world/2020/
apr/24/sweden-queries-basis-of-lockdowns-as-germany-
keeps-its-guard-up.
Hirschman, Albert O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Re-
sponses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
International Labour Organization (2020). As job losses es-
calate, nearly half of global workforce at risk of losing
livelihoods. International Labour Organization. Ac-
cessed May 4, 2020 at: www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS 743036/lang–en/index.htm.
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Keynes, John Maynard (1936) [2007]. The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money. London: Macmil-
lan.
Kwon, Soonman (2020). Covid-19: Lessons from South Ko-
rea. Health Systems Global. Accessed May 17, 2020 at:
https://www.healthsystemsglobal.org/blog/406/COVID-
19-Lessons-from-South-Korea.html.
Lintern, Shaun (2020). Coronavirus: Global Experts Tell
MPs How They Avoided UK’s Care Home Crisis. Inde-
pendent. Accessed May 17, 2020 at: www.independent.
co.uk/news/health/coronavirus-uk-care-homes-mps-hos
pitals-deaths-a9522006.html.
LeMieux, Julianna (2020). Iceland’s Aggressive Covid-19
Tested Helped Curb Outbreak. GEN: Genetic Engineer-
ing and Biotechnology News. Accessed May 4, 2020
at: www.genengnews.com/news/icelands-aggressive-
covid-19-testing-helped-curb-outbreak/.
Mark, Joshua J. (2020). Medieval Cures for the Black Death.
emphAncient History Encyclopedia. Accessed May 7,
2020 at: www.ancient.eu/article/1540/medieval-cures-
for-the-black-death/.
Meunier, Thomas A. J. (2020). Full lockdown policies in
Western Europe countries have no evident impacts on
the COVID-19 epidemic. MedRxiv. Accessed May 1,
2020 at www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.24.
20078717v1.full.pdf.
Observer Reporters (2020). Across the World, Figures Re-
veal Horrific Toll of Care Home Deaths. The Guardian.
Accessed May 17, 2020 at www.theguardian.com/world
/2020/may/16/across-the-world-figures-reveal-horrific-
covid-19-toll-of-care-home-deaths.
OECD (2020). Testing for COVID-19: A way to lift confine-




Orange, Richard (2020). Anger in Sweden as Elderly Pay
Price for Coronavirus Strategy. The Guardian. Ac-
cessed May 17, 2020 at www.theguardian.com/world/20
20/apr/19/anger-in-sweden-as-elderly-pay-price-for-co
ronavirus-strategy.
Nichols, Michelle (2020). U.N. warns economic downturn
could kill hundreds of thousands of children in 2020.




Pell, M. B., & Benjamin Lesser (2020). Special Report -
How the COVID-19 lockdown will take its own toll on




Politico (2020). Europe’s coronavirus lockdown measures
compared. Politico. Assessed May 3, 2020 at: www.poli
tico.eu/article/europes-coronavirus-lockdown-measures-
compared/.
Potter, Christina (2020). Lessons from Iceland. Outbreak
Observatory. Assessed May 17, 2020 at: www.outbreak
observatory.org/outbreakthursday-1/4/16/2020/the-suc
cess-of-iceland.
Rolander, Niclas (2020). Sweden Says Controversial Virus
Strategy Proving Effective. Bloomberg. Assessed May
4, 2020 at: www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-
04-19/sweden-says-controversial-covid-19-strategy-is-
proving-effective.
Smart thinking, lockdown and Covid-19: Implications for public policy — 33/33
Roser, Max, Hannah Ritchie, Esteban Ortiz-Ospina & Joe
Hasell (2020). Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19).
Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Assessed
May 3, 2020 at: ourworldindata.org/coronavirus.
Simon, H. A. (1978). Rationality as a Process and as a
Product of Thought. American Economic Review, 70:
1–16.
Simon, H. A. (1987). “Behavioral Economics”, in J. Eatwell,
M. Millgate, & P. Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A
Dictionary of Economics. London: Macmillan.
Sternlicht, Alexandra (2020). South Korea’s Widespread
Testing and Contact Tracing Lead to First Day with




Strochlic, Nina, & Riley D. Champine (2020). How some
Cities ‘Flattened the Curve’ During the 1918 Flu Pan-




Thaler, Richard H., & Cass R. Sunstein (2009). Nudge:
Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happi-
ness. New York: Penguin Books.
Townsend, Adam (2020). Sweden and Singapore: The
Covid-19 ‘Soft’ Approach vs. Techno-Surveillance.
MedicineNet. Assessed May 4, 2020 at: www.medicine
net.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=230288.
Worldometer (2020). Reported Cases and Deaths by Coun-
try, Territory, or Conveyance. Worldometers. Assessed
May 2, 2020 at: www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/.
